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Abstract
The international market for luxury goods puts pressure on many wildlife
species, with potentially irreversible consequences for many of them. Although
classical economic theory suggests that trade alone would not drive a rare
species to extinction, in practice numerous species are being threatened by
overexploitation. This is for example the case for sturgeons, exploited for their
caviar, of which all 27 species are threatened with extinction. We performed a
caviar-tasting experiment, combined with a modeling approach merging eco-
logical theory and psychosociology. This allowed us to demonstrate that the
human predisposition to place exaggerated value on rarity drives sturgeons’
overexploitation, despite caviar’s ever-increasing price and the imminent loss
of these species. These ﬁndings suggest that this mechanism probably drives
the entire market for wildlife based luxury goods.
Introduction
The international market for luxury goods, including cer-
tain food items, has almost doubled since 1990, with a
worldwide increase of 10% annually (Nueno & Quelch
1998). This trade is fuelled by a great deal of legally
and illegally exploited wildlife species, putting pressure
on many of them, with potentially irreversible conse-
quences. The large decline of sturgeon populations (Pala
2005; Pikitch et al. 2005) is a good example. Sturgeons
are exploited for their caviar, the most coveted delicacy
in the market of luxury goods. Their trade is restricted,
with all 27 species listed since 1997 under Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES) Appendix I (two species) or II
(25 species). However, despite their well-publicized im-
periled status and application of quotas, commercial pres-
sure on 15 species persists (Pikitch et al. 2005), fuelled
by a rising demand and thriving illegal trade (Speer et al.
2000; Stone 2002). In the Caspian Sea, from where 90%
of caviar comes (Stone 2005), the sturgeon population
has declined by 90% over the past two decades (Stone
2002; Pikitch et al. 2005).
Standard economic theory predicts that exploitation
alone is unlikely to result in extinction of a species
because of the escalating cost of ﬁnding the last indi-
viduals of a declining species (the functional response,
Choquenot et al. 1999). According to this theory, eco-
nomic extinction (the cessation of exploitation) should
precede ecological extinction (population or species dis-
appearance), giving it a chance to recover to exploitable
levels (Clark 1990). But in the case of sturgeon, exploita-
tion remains highly proﬁtable (the global legal trade in
caviar is currently worth several hundred million US dol-
lars annually (Pikitch et al. 2005) and prices (which re-
ﬂect the demand) increase as sturgeon stocks deplete and
become rarer (Figure 1). At this rate, specialists estimate
that there will be virtually no more sturgeon left in the
Caspian Sea by 2012 (Pala 2007).
In this study, our aim was to identify the mechanism
responsible for the overexploitation that is quickly driv-
ing the 200-million-year-old sturgeon ﬁsh to extinction.
Caviar-tasting experiments showed that the perceived
rarity of caviar inﬂuences positively the gustative appre-
ciation of the consumers. Using a modeling approach,
we showed that this predisposition to place exaggerated
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Figure 1 Increase in the price of three caviars as
sturgeon stock in the Caspian Sea were depleted
over the period 1981–2000. The Beluga (Huso huso),
the Osetr (Acipenser gueldenstaedtii), and the
Sevruga (Acipenser stellatus) caviars are the most
coveted in the world. All three species are listed as
endangered on the CITES red list since 1996.For each
caviar, the price is inversely correlated (inverse cubic
relationship) to the size of the stock (for Beluga,
Osetr, and Sevruga caviars, respectively, R2 =
0.3913, P = 0.0032; R2 = 0.554, P = 0.0002; R2 =
0.5542, P = 0.0002). Catch data obtained from
Catarci (2004).
value on rarity can push the exploited species into an ex-
tinction vortex. We suggest that this human predisposi-
tion to place exaggerated value on rarity probably drives
the entire luxury market for luxury goods from reptile
skins to exotic woods, and thereby constitutes a threat to
biodiversity.
Methods
Tasting sessions
We organized caviar-tasting sessions during private
Parisian luxury receptions hosting guests belonging to the
upper socio-professional classes (the French are among
the largest caviar consumers in the world; TRAFFIC
2007). The caviar offered during those tasting sessions
(Acipenser baeri caviar) came from a French sturgeon-
breeding farm (Sturgeon Company, Saint Sulpice et
Cameyrac, France). It was a high-quality caviar that had
previously been evaluated as excellent by a jury of French
experts (Leygnier & Victoria 1999). Each can of caviar
used for the experiments was divided vertically in two
halves, which were subsequently presented in two strictly
identical display bowls. One half was labeled as com-
ing from a “rare species” of sturgeon, and the other as
coming from a “common species” of sturgeon. Thus, the
only (apparent) difference between the two caviars was
the label (“rare species” or “common species”), and any
other difference in ﬂavor, aspect, smell, or presentation
was avoided. We regularly switched the position of the
two labels to avoid an effect of the initial position of the
samples (which was subsequently tested and not found to
inﬂuence choice). We proposed simultaneously two sam-
ples of “rare” and “common” caviar to 316 volunteer con-
sumers. Consumers were asked to taste both caviars, but
chose the sample they wanted to taste ﬁrst. Tasting was
followed by a short questionnaire in which the consumer
was asked to (1) give and justify his/her preference, if
any, (2) give a mark out of 20 to each of the caviars, (3)
justify the choice of the ﬁrst caviar tasted, and (4) indicate
the frequency at which he/she usually ate caviar. Justi-
ﬁcation of the choice of the ﬁrst caviar tasted provided
an index of the consumers’ intellectual/mental approach
when facing a choice between a product coming from a
“rare” or a “common” species.
As a control, we also conducted three sessions in
three large supermarkets located in the suburbs of Paris,
where customers were more representative of the av-
erage French consumer, that is, a noncaviar-consuming
public. In total, 308 customers were interviewed there.
The experimental design was similar to that for the lux-
ury receptions.
Analyses
Selection of variables affecting consumers’
preference
We ﬁrst tested for potential effects of different aspects of
the methods on the choice made by consumers in each
of the two tasting session categories (i.e., luxury recep-
tion or supermarket). We used generalized linear mod-
els (GLM) with binomial distribution and logit link func-
tion to test the effects of the following variables: gender
of the consumer, position of the label “rare” (i.e., to the
right or to the left of the consumer), session (i.e., ses-
sion 1, 2, or 3), and the sample tasted ﬁrst (this variable
is noted “ﬁrst” in Table 1). Identity of observer (n = 8)
was not tested because of a correlation with the session
variable. Candidate models were constructed a priori and
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Table 1 Selection of variables affecting consumers’ preference. Models are sorted from largest to smallest by AIC weight. Model selection shows a
strong effect of a positive a priori for the “rare” caviar on the preference expressed by consumers after the tasting session.
AIC Nb % of explained
Models AIC weights par deviance
Tests of method effects on consumer preference
1. preference ∼ ﬁrst 318.77 0.3760 1 4.37%
2. preference ∼ gender + ﬁrst + sessiona 319.26 0.2943 4 6.04%
3. preference ∼ gender + ﬁrstb 319.90 0.2137 2 4.63%
4. preference ∼ gender + position + ﬁrst + session 321.16 0.1138 5 6.07%
5. preference ∼ gender × position × ﬁrst × session 330.63 0.0010 23 14.13%
6. preference ∼ gender 332.90 0.0003 1 0.08%
Tests of effects determining the choice of the ﬁrst sample tasted
7. ﬁrst ∼ a priori 281.12 0.5292 1 10.62%
8. ﬁrst ∼ a priori + proﬁle 281.51 0.4354 4 12.42%
9. ﬁrst ∼ a priori × proﬁle 286.53 0.0354 7 12.74%
10. ﬁrst ∼ proﬁle 317.72 <0.0001 3 0.10%
aAs “position” was randomized during the protocol, we made the hypothesis that the respective positions of the samples “rare” and “common” had no
effect on the preference.
bAs volunteers of the three sessions belonged to the same socio-professional class, we made the hypothesis that the session variable had to effect on
the preference.
contrasted using Akaike’s information criterion (AIC).
The relative support of the models was obtained by com-
paring AIC weights and percent of explained deviance
(Table 1).
Model selection process indicated that only the order
in which consumers tasted the two samples had an effect
on the preference (cf. Figure 2B and Table 1; for clar-
ity, only the results obtained with the luxury receptions
dataset are presented, results obtained with the super-
markets dataset being similar). Using the same method,
a second GLM allowed us to explore whether the choice
of the ﬁrst sample tasted might have been inﬂuenced by
a positive a priori in favor of the rare species sample and
by the consumers’ proﬁle (i.e., their consumption fre-
quency). The potential effect of the consumers’ proﬁle
was only tested in luxury receptions. Overall, only the
effect of a positive a priori for the rare species sample was
selected by the models as a factor inﬂuencing the choice
of the ﬁrst sample tasted (Table 1).
Quality appreciation of the two caviar samples
Marks did not follow a normal distribution (Shapiro-Wilk
test for normality; W = 0.95; probability of making a Type
I error < 0.0001; n = 1030), but ﬁtted a gamma distribu-
tion (Adequacy LR test; χ2 = 0.279; probability of making
a Type I error = 0.87; n = 1030). To compare the marks
given to the two samples by each consumer, we deﬁned
a generalized linear mixed-effects model (GLMM) with
gamma distribution and log link function, with the sam-
ple label “rare” or “common” as the ﬁxed effect and the
individual as a random effect.
Statistical analyses of the data obtained were per-
formed using JMP 5.0.1 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC,
USA, 2002) and R 2.1.1 software (The R Foundation for
statistical computing, Vienna, Austria). Continuous data
are described through their mean and standard deviation
(mean ± SD).
Optimal strategy for consumers informed of the
rarity of a resource
We next established a game theoretic model to identify
the most rational behavior (i.e., consume now or post-
pone consumption) of consumers attracted by a rare but
fragile resource, such as caviar, to optimize their pay-
off (i.e., satisfaction) over time. Immediate consumption
is satisfying, while postponing consumption allows the
population to recover to safer levels. We ﬁrst built a
two-player payoff matrix to identify the optimal strategy
for a consumer attracted by a resource that can be de-
pleted by consumption. This game, based on the same
hypotheses as a prisoner’s dilemma game (both players
have the same strategy space and they can not see what
the other do before they act), is dominant solvable (i.e.,
there is an evolutionary stable strategy). We then mod-
iﬁed it into a second matrix, with n players and a pos-
sibility for the consumers to modify their own strategy
when they observe the others (see Figure 3 for details).
The matrix (Figure 3B) displays expected payoffs for fo-
cal consumer A, depending on his own strategy and the
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Figure 2 Preference of consumers for rare caviar. (A), Proportion of
consumers who had a positive a priori for the rare species caviar even
before tasting the samples. (B), Posttasting preferences. (C), Marks they
attributedtothetwosamples.(D),Effectofconsumerproﬁleonexpressed
preferenceforrareorcommonspeciescaviar.Theexistenceofapositive
a priori preference for the rare species caviar determined which sample
theconsumerschosetostartwith.Thisinturndeterminedtheﬁnalprefer-
ence expressed by the consumer. These results were similar whether the
experimentswereconductedinluxuryreceptionsorinsupermarkets(see
theMethodssectionfordetailsofthestatisticalanalysis).Thesymbol“∗∗∗“
indicates a probability of making a Type I error < 0.0001; “ns” indicates a
probability of making a Type I error > 0.05.
strategies adopted by the n other potential consumers,
which A is assumed to observe. A is assumed to decide
at time t whether he shall consume immediately or post-
pone his consumption until t + τ. Consuming lasts until
the end of the game. If A observes i consumers (0 ≤ i ≤
n − 1) at t, expected payoff of postponing consumption
is X · Pi
τ − Qi
τ, unless the exploited resource is depleted
before t + τ, in which case payoff is 0, where Pi
τ is the
probability (estimated by A) that the resource will not be
depleted at t + τ. Assuming consumers take account of
this probability in the computation of their expected pay-
off is not tantamount to saying that they explicitly focus
on the possibility that the resource go depleted; it sim-
ply means that they rationally integrate this element to
their strategy choice. Here, Qi
τ =

k=i,n−1 Rk
τi · ck,a n dRk
τi
is the probability (estimated by A) that there will be k
consumers at t + τ,g i v e nt h a tt h e r ea r ei consumers at t
(for a deﬁnition of the other parameters, see Figure 3).
ci is an increasing function of i, as competition inten-
siﬁes with the number of consumers. Hence, X − ci is
a decreasing function of i. Similarly, X · Pi
τ − Qi
τ is a de-
creasing function of i. Moreover, for (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1),
X · Pi
τ − Qi
τ < X − ci (this is because for i ≤ j ≤ n − 1,
R
j
τi ≤ 1, as there are at least as many consumers at t + τ
than there were at t). This leads to the matrix structure
showed on Figure 3B, which determines the dominant
strategy for A.
Demographic consequences for rare species
We devised a macroscopic model, adapted from the clas-
sical logistic model, to study the consequences of the be-
havior of potential consumers (players) on the dynamics
of an exploited population of size N. In this model, each
player could choose at each time step to start consum-
ing an individual from the exploited population or wait
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Figure 3 Game theory models demonstrate
the beneﬁt of consuming now rather than
postponing consumption of rare commodities.
( A )M a t r i xo fe x p e c t e dp a y o f fo fas i m p l e
two-player game theory model in which both
players can either consume now or postpone
consumption to the next time step. (B)
Equivalent matrix with n players, where A
chooses to consume either now (t)o rl a t e r( t +
τ) while knowing how many consumers will
consume the resource now. This model
accounts for the decrease of the elementary
gain X through the competition with i other
consumers, (ci), the probability (estimated by
A) for the resource not to be depleted at t + τ
when i players consume at t,( P
i
τ), and the
corresponding expected value of ci,( Q
i
τ). In
both matrices, the rational strategy is to
consume now, until extinction.
until the next time step. We supposed that consumers
were aware of others’ decisions and that they could
thereby inﬂuence each other. The behavior of the play-
ers was given by the game theory model and each player
removed one individual from the exploited population at
each time step. Population dynamics were given by the
per capita growth rate ( ), i.e., dN/Ndt, with dN/dt =
rN (1 – N/K)–i. The change in consumer numbers was
given by di/dt = [ϕ + iψ] × [n – i]. We obtained   by
solving these two equations. r is the intrinsic growth rate
of the exploited population and K its carrying capacity.
Among the n players (potential consumers), there are i
consumers at time t, ϕ is the number of players who con-
sume the exploited species irrespective of what others do,
and ψ is the increment in the number of players who
consume due to the other’s choice to consume.
Results
Caviar consumers’ attraction to rarity
Even before they tasted either sample, 57% of the con-
sumers interviewed during luxury receptions explicitly
expressed an a priori preference for the rare species
caviar, (Pearson Chi-square homogeneity test: χ2 = 6.02,
df = 1, probability of making a Type I error < 0.0001,
n = 307). No one expressed an a priori preference for the
common caviar (Figure 2A).
Having tasted the two samples, a majority (86.1%;
Pearson Chi-square homogeneity test: χ2 = 111.01, df =
2, probability of making a Type I error < 0.0001, n =
316) preferred one of the two samples, despite the sam-
ples being strictly identical. Among this majority, 70.2%
preferred the rare species caviar (Figure 2B; Pearson Chi-
square homogeneity test: χ2 = 44.49, df = 1, probability
of making a Type I error < 0.0001, n = 272).
When asked to give a mark to each sample to judge
its gustative quality, consumers scored the caviar of the
rare species higher than the common one (14.96 ± 2.6
vs. 13.42 ± 2.94; n = 272; GLMM; F = 49.017, df = 1,
probability of making a Type I error < 0.0001; Figure 2C).
T h ep r e f e r e n c ef o rt h er a r ec a v i a rd i dn o tv a r yw i t ht h e
frequency of consumption of caviar by the interviewees
in the luxury receptions (GLM; χ2 = 3.943, df = 3,
probability of making a Type I error = 0.27, n = 271;
Figure 2D).
Similar results were obtained with consumers inter-
viewed in supermarkets: 52.3% expressed a positive a
priori and 74.2% a conﬁrmed preference for the rare
caviar (Figure 2D). The rare species caviar also obtained
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higher grades than the common species caviar (GLMM;
F = 0.164, df = 1, probability of making a Type I error =
0.69, n = 515; see the Methods section for details of the
analysis).
Optimal strategy for consumers informed of the
rarity of a resource and demographic
consequences for rare species
Our game theory model showed that the expected payoff
of consuming later, for the sake of sustainable resource
management, is always lower than the expected payoff
of consuming now, whatever the choice of other con-
sumers (Figures 3A and 3B). This model also shows that
when a species is rare, the rationality of rushing to con-
sume instead of waiting increases as more consumers de-
cide to consume (Figure 3B). This principle of diachronic
rationality (or rationality over time) explains, at least in
part, why people exhibit such seemingly irrational behav-
ior towards sturgeon exploitation. It should be empha-
sized that this result would be reinforced if the hypothesis
were made, as it is usually made in economic modeling
(Olson & Bailey 1981), that consumers apply a positive
temporal discount rate to their payoff. Our model shows
this debatable hypothesis to be unnecessary, and it may
Figure 4 Trend of exploited populations of size N
and per capita growth rate  . This graph shows the
relationship between the population growth rate
and its size with time, when the population is rare
(red lines) and when it is not (blue line). The initial
conditions are symbolized by the colored circles,
and the trend, towards N = 0 (red lines) or   = 0
(blue line), is shown by black arrowheads; when i =
n or i = 0, all possible initial conditions are along
the line (see text for parameter explanations). While
under this model populations that are not rare are
not exploited and keep a positive growth rate until
K, exploitation of a rare population decreases its
growth rate. Below a given population threshold
(here arbitrarily set at N = 20), there are
increasingly more players deciding to consume
without waiting, until all do so (i = n;h e r ea tN =
15). Exploitation ampliﬁcation drives the population
to extinction.
hence appear more robust than standard economic mod-
els in this regard. Finally, the demographic model shows
that the human attraction for rarity fuels a disproportion-
ate exploitation of the resource, rendering it increasingly
rare and thus ever more desirable, until total depletion
(Figure 4).
Discussion
Our ﬁndings with both novice and regular caviar con-
sumers demonstrate an irrational preference for the
caviar they believed came from a rare species, although
both the rare and common samples came from the same
can. However, when interviewees were asked to grade
the two samples, and thus to quantify how much bet-
ter the “rare” caviar tasted, the grades they gave were
close, the “common caviar” being graded only about 1.5
points less than the “rare caviar” (out of 20). Although
there was statistical evidence for a difference, it was not
large. Our interpretation is that the information people
were given on rarity introduced confusion on their actual
gustative preference. This means that preference for rar-
ity does exist and inﬂuences behavior. In our study, only
French consumers, renowned, ironically, for their taste
for luxury products and their sophisticated palates, were
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tested. However there is no reason to think that this pref-
erence does not hold for consumers outside France.
The artiﬁcial value placed on rare products probably
drives the entire luxury goods market, in which inter-
personal motives (Vigneron & Johnson 1999), reﬂecting
the consumers’ self-consciousness (Brinberg & Plimpton
1986) and social inﬂuence, play a major role for prestige-
seeking consumers. We show here that, in a simple set-
ting where consumers directly extract a rare resource,
this human attraction for rarity can lead to its deple-
tion. On real world markets, however, the whole story is
likely to be more complicated. Indeed, the phenomenon
we pinpoint is entirely based on demand-side considera-
tions. One could argue that, in the face of such a demand,
basic supply-side management practices would consist in
refraining from depleting the resource in order to secure
future gains from trade. The impeccable part of this re-
joinder is that economic institutions and local property
rights regimes are indeed undoubtedly likely to inﬂu-
ence the fate of resources (as is analyzed in numerous
case studies, drawing on Coase’s 1960 insight: for ex-
ample, Ostrom et al. 1994, Grafton 2000, Grafton et al.
2000). But our aim here was not to provide for a grant
all-encompassing theory, it was to stress on a basic mech-
anism whose multifarious consequences we urge should
be investigated. Indeed, the very notion that rarity itself
could exaggerate demand is apt to throw a new light on
the debates on how to alleviate the “Tragedy of the Com-
mons” (Hardin 1968) and how to secure “optimal ex-
traction” of renewable resources. This process we iden-
tiﬁed is characteristic of an anthropogenic Allee effect:
a human-generated mechanism that leads the exploited
species into an extinction vortex (Courchamp et al. 2006).
This process was named by analogy with the Allee effect
(Courchamp et al. 1999, Berec et al. 2007), a mechanism
by which plants or animals have a lower ﬁtness in small
populations than in larger populations. This translates
into lower population growth rates (and even negative
growth rates) at low densities, ultimately driving these
populations to extinction.
The phenomenon we describe here presents a risk for
biodiversity in general: it seems that any species, ex-
ploited for whatever reason, can turn into a rare and cov-
eted species exposed to high extinction risks. It is the case
for sturgeon caviar, which used to be inexpensive when
common, was consumed in large quantities by Russian
nobility and served in the 1900s in American bars for a
penny a pound to make consumers thirsty. It may also
be the case for many other delicacies, such as the abalone
Haliotis spp., the blueﬁn tuna, Thunnus thynnus,a n dt h e
Napoleon wrasse Cheilinus undulates (a single pair of lips
costs US$250; Lee & Sadovy 1998). Other wildlife
products are also concerned: exotic woods (mahogany,
ebony), reptile skins (snakes, crocodiles, lizards), furs and
leather hides (wild cats, antelopes) are used for luxury
clothes and accessories. For example, the demand for
shahtoosh shawls made from the wool of the Tibetan
antelope (Pantholops hodgsonii, also called chiru), caused
the global population of chirus to decline over the last 50
years (Harris et al. 1999; Mallon 2003). As they become
rarer, these animals may be increasingly exploited.
The tendencies of both conﬁrmed and novice caviar
consumers to prefer rare species suggests that this
predilection is not restricted to current consumers, but
that anyone reaching a sufﬁcient level of wealth to af-
ford luxury items would probably respond in this way.
This ﬁnding is especially worrying as the general level
of world wealth grows. The luxury market has expanded
continually over the past 25 years due to people’s grow-
ing materialism (Powderly & MacNulty 1990; Vigneron &
Johnson 1999), their increased buying power (The World
Bank Group 2008), and the recent tendency towards
“democratisation” of luxury (Dubois & Laurent 1998).
The emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and
China are also swelling the number of consumers able to
enter this market (Wong & Ahuvia 1998). For example,
by 2011 a quarter-billion consumers will make China the
world’s largest consumer of luxury goods (Ernst & Young
2005). The pressure on wildlife species that are already
rare or likely to become rare is thus likely to increase in
the short run.
The fact that rarity seems to play a role in fueling caviar
trade makes it particularly difﬁcult to control sturgeon ex-
ploitation. In addition to this psychological aspect stands a
nonnegligible cultural aspect for countries that have been
historically producing and consuming caviar, such as the
Caspian Littoral States, and especially Russia.
Given the threatened status of sturgeons today, it
might seem the straightforward policy recommendation
should be to ban all caviar imports. However, evidence
suggest that trade bans can also stimulate illegal trade
(Rivalan et al. 2007). Applying quotas would generate a
situation with a tradeoff difﬁcult to manage: low quotas
(small trade volumes) would not reduce the caviar value
enough (it would still be “rare”) while high quotas (large
trade volumes) would not protect the species. Whatever
the quota policy selected, it should be applied in conjunc-
tion with producer and especially consumer education, as
well as valorization of a farmed substitute for wild caviar
(e.g., through employment of local ﬁsh workers, pay-
ment of incentives and revenues for good management).
Switching to farmed caviar will not be easy for caviar con-
sumers, as they might prefer wild caviar, just as they pre-
fer a “rare” caviar compared to a “common” one. Such a
preference for wildlife products rather than their farmed
equivalents has been demonstrated in the market of
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traditional Asian medicine (Anderson et al. 2002, Nowell
& Ling 2007). A change in the consumers’ behavior to-
wards an ethical and sustainable consumerism (Cooney &
Jepson 2006) seems the key to sturgeon survival, as well
as other wildlife species concerned with luxury trade.
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